Equilibrium welfare and government policy with quasi-geometric discounting

Equilibrium welfare and government policy with quasi-geometric discounting by Per Krusell Download PDF EPUB FB2

Equilibrium Welfare and Government Policy with Quasi-Geometric Discounting Per Krusell, Burhanettin Kuru¸s¸cu, and Anthony A. Smith, Jr.∗ August ∗Per Krusell and Burhanettin Kuru¸s¸cu are at the Department of Economics, Harkness Hall, Univer-sity of Rochester, Rochester, NYtelephone ()fax ()and e.

The planner is a consumer representative who, without commitment but in a time-consistent way, maximizes his or her present-value utility subject to resource constraints. The competitive equilibrium results in strictly higher welfare than the planning problem whenever the discounting is not by: Equilibrium Welfare and Government Policy with Quasi-geometric Discounting1 1 KrusellandSmiththanktheNationalScienceFoundationforfinancialsupport.

PerKrusell Department of Economics, Harkness Hall, University of Rochester, Rochester, New York ; and Institute for International Economic Studies and the CEPR [email protected] The planner is a consumer representative who, without commitment but in a time-consistent way, maximizes his presentvalue utility subject to resource constraints.

The competitive equilibrium results in strictly higher welfare than does the planning problem whenever the discounting is not geometric. The competitive equilibrium results in strictly higher welfare than does the planning problem whenever the discounting is not geometric.

We also explicitly consider taxation in our environment. With a benevolent government that can tax income and capital, but cannot commit its future tax rates, time-consistent taxation leads to positive tax rates on capital. Equilibrium Welfare and Government Policy with Quasi-Geometric Discounting.

By Per Krusell, Burhanettin Kuruscu, Anthony A. Smith and Jr. Abstract. We consider a representative-agent equilibrium model where the consumer has quasi-geometric discounting and cannot commit to future actions. We restrict attention to a parametric class for. Equilibrium Welfare and Government Policy with Quasi-Geometric Discounting.

By Per Krusell, Burhanettin Kuruscu and Anthony A Smith Jr. Abstract. We consider a representative-agent equilibrium model where the consumer has quasi-geometric discounting and cannot commit to future actions.

With restricted attention to a parametric class for. The competitive equilibrium results in strictly higher welfare than does the planning problem whenever the discounting is not -geometric discounting, markov equilibrium, taxation, time-consistent policy.

Equilibrium welfare and government policy with quasi-geometric discounting By P. Krusell, B. Kuruscu, A.A. Smith and London (United Kingdom) Centre for Economic Policy Research Abstract. No. - Equilibrium Welfare and Government Policy with Quasi-Geometric Discounting Vai alla versione italiana Site Search by P.

Krusell. Equilibrium Welfare and Government Policy with Quasi-Geometric Discounting Article in Journal of Economic Theory (1) September with 24 Reads How we measure 'reads'. quasi-geometric discounting government policy equilibrium welfare planning problem future action parametric class representative-agent equilibrium model competitive equilibrium result present-value utility subject time-consistent way time-consistent competitive equilibrium consumer representative cannot commit economic literature classification number welfare property competitive equilibrium.

The competitive equilibrium results in strictly higher welfare than does the planning problem whenever the discounting is not geometric. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of. This study introduces quasi-geometric discounting into a simple growth model of common capital accumulation that takes consumption externalities into account.

We examine how present bias affects economic growth and welfare, and we consider two equilibrium concepts: the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium (NNE) and the cooperative equilibrium (CE).Author: Koichi Futagami, Yuta Nakabo.

Numerous studies consider Öscal policy if the government has time-inconsistent preferences with present bias. For instance, Krusell et al. () consider a representative-agent equilibrium model with the consumer who has quasi-geometric discounting and cannot commit to future actions.

They. (): "Equilibrium Welfare and Government Policy with Quasi-Geometric Discounting," Journal of Economic Theory,LAIBSON, D.

(): "Self-Control and Saving," Ph.D. Dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Tech- nology. (): "Hyperbolic Discount Functions and Time Preference Heterogeneity," Manuscript. This paper develops a dynamic general equilibrium model in which households have a preference of quasi-geometric discounting, as in Krusell et al.

(), and face a cash-in-advance constraint. Through this extension, we show that this economy engages in over-saving, although households have present bias, and the optimal growth rate of money Author: Daiki Maeda. The first case involves a welfare loss relative to expanding the number of policy instruments and the second involves a welfare loss relative to the competitive equilibrium, so only the third.

Downloadable. In this paper, we analyze monetary and fiscal policies in a dynamic general equilibrium model in which households have a preference of quasi-geometric discounting and face a cash- in-advance constraint. From this policy analysis, we obtain the following two outcomes. First, when the government can control only the money supply, the Friedman rule is : Daiki Maeda.

We study a two-sector endogenous growth model with quasi-geometric discounting in which human capital is the engine of growth. We show that a planning economy welfare-dominates a competitive economy and time-consistent government policy is welfare-improving if Cited by: 1.

Equilibrium Welfare and Government Policy with Quasi-Geometric Discounting Temi di discussione (Economic working papers), Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area View citations (11) Also in CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R.

Discussion Papers () View citations (28) See also Journal Article in Journal of Economic.Equilibrium Welfare and Government Policy with Quasi-geometric Discounting (with Per Krusell and Burhanettin Kuruscu), Journal of Economic Theory, Time Orientation and Asset Prices (with Per Krusell and Burhanettin Kuruscu), Journal of Monetary Economics, We study properties of stationary Markov-perfect equilibria in a general model of intertemporal choice under quasi-geometric discounting.

The dynamics generated by stationary Markov-perfect equilibria can be very complicated, even if the model satisfies strict convexity and smoothness properties and the decision maker is arbitrarily by: